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This article raises the issue of the correct characterization of ‘Parametric 
Variation’ in syntax and phonology. After specifying their theoretical 
commitments, the authors outline the relevant parts of the Principles–and–
Parameters framework, and draw a three-way distinction among Universal 
Principles, Parameters, and Accidents. The core of the contribution then 
consists of an attempt to provide identity criteria for parametric, as opposed 
to non-parametric, variation. Parametric choices must be antecedently 
known, and it is suggested that they must also satisfy seven individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient criteria. These are that they be cognitively 
represented, systematic, dependent on the input, deterministic, discrete, 
mutually exclusive, and irreversible. 
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A persistent preoccupation of generative linguistics has been the tension, border-
ing on paradox, between two questions: “Why are there so many languages?” 
and “Why are they all so similar?”. The tension is sufficiently great that many 
writers, dazzled by the obviousness of the first, are tempted to deny the truth of 
the second: Evans & Levinson’s (2009) ‘The myth of language universals’ is a 
recent example. A resolution of the tension can be found in the framework of 
‘Principles–and–Parameters’ (Chomsky 1981a, 1981b; for overviews and history, 
see Roberts 1997, Baker 2001, and especially Biberauer 2008a), but making this 
claim plausible to the skeptics necessitates elaboration and refinement of the 
theory, in particular of the nature and scope of ‘parametric’ variation. It is this 
issue we try to address in the current contribution, suggesting identity criteria for 
parametric as opposed to non-parametric differences among languages. The 
situation is reminiscent of the debate about human types: The apparent obvious 
diversity of different ‘races’ disguises profound underlying unity, and specifying 
the nature of the variation is fraught with difficulty. In what follows we spell out 
our theoretical presuppositions, we present the elements of the Principles–and–
Parameters framework and their motivation, and we suggest and defend our 
identity criteria. 
 We take seriously the central claim of the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 
1995) that in elucidating the nature of the human faculty of language, linguistic 
theory should restrict itself to what is conceptually necessary or descriptively 
inevitable. Accordingly, we adopt Hauser et al.’s (2002) contrast between the 
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Faculty of Language in the broad sense (FLB) and the Faculty of Language in the 
narrow sense (FLN), seeking to identify defining properties of FLN, even if this 
latter may perhaps consist simply of possible re-combinations of elements of FLB. 
We have argued elsewhere against Hauser et al.’s claim that recursion is the 
unique property of FLN (see Smith & Law 2007: 2) on the grounds that recursion 
must be characteristic of the Language of Thought in Fodor’s (1975, 2008) sense. 
However, we are happy to go along with Chomsky’s (2009a: 29) suggestion that 
Natural Language is the same as the Language of Thought except for ‘externaliz-
ation’ (cf. Smith 1983). That is, language links the Conceptual–Intentional and 
Sensori–Motor interfaces, where the former equates to the language of thought 
and the latter, as used for communication (perception and production), character-
izes natural languages, which emerged evolutionarily as the result of being exter-
nalized. This external form is anyway the domain of parametric variation, the 
existence of which may moreover be a defining property of the human language 
faculty.  
 The Principles–and–Parameters framework provides simultaneously a 
solution to Plato’s problem and the problem of characterizing typological variety. 
UG (short for ‘Universal Grammar’, the innate endowment that the child brings 
to the task of language acquisition) specifies that human languages consist of a 
Lexicon and a ‘computational system’ (referred to as CHL, the computation for 
human language). The lexicon consists of a set of lexical entries, each of which is 
a triple of phonological, morpho-syntactic, and semantic features, and with a link 
to associated encyclopedic information. UG also provides a set of exceptionless 
principles, such as structure dependence (Chomsky 1971), (strict) cyclicity 
(Freidin 1999, Chomsky 2002), the Extended Projection Principle (Chomsky 1995), 
etc., which constrain the operations of the computations and act as a constraint 
on language acquisition: Children learning their first language have their ‘hypo-
thesis space’ tightly constrained with the result that they never make mistakes of 
a particular kind. However, “[…] principles do not determine the answers to all 
questions about language, but leave some questions as open parameters” 
(Berwick & Chomsky, forthcoming: 8 [in the 2008 manuscript]). 
 That is, in addition to a set of universal principles, UG provides a set of 
parameters which jointly define the limits of language variation. This is typically 
conceptualized as the setting of a number of ‘switches’ — on or off — for 
particular linguistic properties. Examples of such parameters in syntax are the 
head-direction parameter (whether heads, such as Verb, Noun, and Preposition, 
precede or follow their complement), the null-subject (or ‘pro-drop’) parameter 
(whether finite clauses can have empty pronominal subjects), and the null-deter-
miner parameter (whether noun phrases can have empty determiners). Typical 
examples in phonology are provided by the stress differences characteristic of 
English and French, and the possibility of complex consonant clusters found in 
English but not in Japanese. English stress is ‘quantity-sensitive’, whereas French 
stress is ‘quantity-insensitive’, with the result that words with the same number 
of syllables may have different stress in English but must have uniform stress in 
French; in English, words may begin with clusters of consonants in a way which 
is impossible in Japanese, with the result that English loans into Japanese appear 
with the clusters separated by epenthetic vowels. 
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 The theory thus unifies two different domains: typology and acquisition. 
Variation among the world’s languages (more accurately the set of internalized I-
languages; Chomsky 1986) is defined in terms of parametric differences and, in 
first language acquisition, the child’s task is reduced to setting the values of such 
parameters on the basis of the stimuli it is exposed to — utterances in the 
ambient language. Given the strikingly uniform success of first language acqui-
sition, it follows that “the set of possibilities [must] be narrow in range and easily 
attained by the first language learner” (Smith 2004: 83). By hypothesis, the 
principles do not vary from child to child or from language to language so, as 
Chomsky (2006: 183) puts it, “acquisition is a matter of parameter setting, and is 
therefore divorced entirely from […] the principles of UG”. 
 The theory is at once ‘internalist’ (i.e. it is a theory of states of the mind/ 
brain), pertaining to knowledge which is largely unconscious, and universalist. 
An immediate implication of this position is that the range of parametric choices 
is known in advance and, as a corollary, it claims that acquisition is largely a 
process of ‘selection’ rather than instruction (see Piattelli–Palmarini 1989) and 
that such acquisition is likely to take place in a critical period or periods.  
 This brief characterization raises a number of problems. The first of these is 
the issue of deciding which phenomena are to be accounted for by reference to 
principles and which by reference to parameters, as exemplified in the history of 
subjacency which began as a universal principle but was later parameterized. 
More importantly, does this binary choice exhaust the ontology? We argue that 
parameters account for some of the surface variability — but only some: Much 
variation is accidental. Accordingly, we need a three-way distinction: Universal 
Principles, Parameters, and Accidents. Note that even universal principles may 
have their status obscured by recalcitrant data. For instance, the universality of 
Merge is not in question even though some items — interjections — do not parti-
cipate. Similarly, a clear and classic instance of a parameter is ‘head direction’, 
even though some examples are problematic like English notwithstanding, which 
can occur before or after its complement, or the occurrence in German of synony-
mous (and etymologically related) pairs of preposition and postposition (e.g., 
längs des Flusses/ den Fluss entlang ‘along the river’). Finally, there are ‘accidents’, 
exemplified by gaps in morphological paradigms, such as the lack of a past tense 
form for beware; by the (claimed) absence of recursion in Pirahã (Everett 2005), or 
by the absence of initial consonants in Arrernte syllable structure (Breen & Pen-
salfini 1999). 
 Assignment to each of these categories may of course be problematic, with 
the uncertainty having potentially significant implications for broader consider-
ations such as innateness. Thus Chomsky (2009b: 385), in discussing the optimi-
zation of the language faculty in terms of third-factor considerations, writes: “If 
you take a parameter and you genetically fix the value, it becomes a principle 
[…]. So adding parameters is reducing genetic information”. This stance is 
similar to Janet Fodor’s (2009) characterization of principles and parameters as a 
Minimax solution: ‘minimize genetic information’ and ‘maximize/optimize the 
amount of learning’.  
 Reverting to the remarks above about Natural Language and the Language 
of Thought and the assumption that the syntax of both is the same (but see Smith 
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2004: 43f. for problems with this position), it is clear that “parameterization and 
diversity too would be mostly — maybe entirely — restricted to externalization” 
(Chomsky, in press: 14 [2008 manuscript]; to “language shorn of the properties of 
the sound system” as Smith 2004: 43 puts it), hence mainly morphology and pho-
nology. One reason for the multiplicity of languages is then that “the problem of 
externalization can be solved in many different and independent ways” 
(Chomsky, in press: 15 [2008 manuscript]), where, moreover, these may all be 
‘optimal’ in different ways. The interesting implication is that there is no para-
metric variation at the Conceptual–Intentional interface (but see below) and per-
haps not even any parametric variation in the syntax narrowly construed (CHL). 
 Despite these observations, we propose for illustrative purposes to pursue 
with the majority of linguists the possibility that parametric variation (hereafter 
‘PV’) characterizes both syntax and phonology. Further, if there is to be any 
content to the ‘parametric’ part of PV, there is need to work out necessary and 
sufficient conditions for something to count as parametric. That is, we are in 
explicit opposition to those such as Kayne (2005: 6 and elsewhere), Manzini & 
Savoia (2007), and Rita Manzini (p.c.), for whom all (syntactic) variation is para-
metric. We reject this stance because of the need to constrain possible parameters. 
In the absence of such constraints “the term ‘parameter’ would end up being 
nothing but jargon for ‘language-particular rule’” (Newmeyer 2005: 53) or, as 
Moro (2008: 107) puts it: “If there were no restrictive generalization on the format 
of parameters, the theory would be too weak”. 
 Before suggesting such restrictions, it is important to note that the nature of 
the identity criteria, even the possibility of coming up with any, is dependent on 
the version of Principles–and–Parameters theory that one adopts. There are 
several possibilities available in the literature. First, as seen in Rizzi’s (2009: 95–
96) discussion, there is a conceptual contrast between theories which indulge in 
overspecification (where UG contains specific statements for certain choices, 
which must be fixed by experience) and those which indulge in under-
specification (where UG has nothing to say — there are gaps, to be filled by 
experience; cf.: “UG limits the space of possible hypothes[e]s, but does nothing 
more” (Nevins 2004: 121)). 
 Second, this distinction cross-cuts that between macro-parametric and 
micro-parametric variation (for discussion see Baker 2008). ‘Macro’-PV is 
typically exemplified by the head-direction (head-first/head-last) parameter 
(Chomsky 1981a) or Baker’s (1996) polysynthesis parameter which determines 
the overall morphological structure of the language. Each of these parameters has 
a wide variety of effects, whereas ‘micro’-PV of the sort exemplified by the choice 
of auxiliary to accompany unaccusative verbs (Perlmutter 1978, Burzio 1986) or 
case realignment in Albanian causatives (Manzini & Savoia 2007) is characteristi-
cally more restricted and has correspondingly fewer repercussions. An emerging 
consensus seems to be that the ‘macro/micro’ contrast is not important: “The 
extent-of-variation question is not well defined or theoretically very interesting” 
(Baker 2008: 371). We agree, though we wish to argue that the parametric/non-
parametric distinction is important both in syntax and in the phonological 
domain where there is no comparable macro-micro contrast. There is, third, the 
related issue of whether parameters pertain to principles, as in Chomsky’s 
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original proposal (Chomsky 1981b) or the later, widely accepted, ‘Borer–
Chomsky Conjecture’ (cf. Biberauer 2008a) that all (syntactic) parameters refer to 
features of functional heads in the lexicon, so that the number of parameters cor-
responds to the size of the functional lexicon. While we are sympathetic to the 
restriction implied by the conjecture its apparent irrelevance to phonology makes 
it less central to our concerns. 
 At a lower level of abstraction we come, fourth, to the domain or locus of 
parametric variation. Biberauer (2008a: 32) suggests that the locus of parameters 
is “the Lexicon and one or more of the Interfaces”. We are anxious that our 
identity criteria should pertain to phonology as well as syntax and if, despite the 
remarks about externalization above, it proves that there are relevant examples, 
to semantic choices at the C–I interface (cf. Chierchia 1998), so we are happy to 
follow this suggestion. At a finer level of detail, Rizzi (2009: 213ff.) observes that 
syntactic parameters, located within the lexicon, may pertain to any of the three 
basic computational processes of the syntax: Merge (e.g., head direction), Move 
(e.g., V to T), and Spell-Out (e.g., Null-subject). Again, there is no obvious phono-
logical counterpart to this taxonomy. 
 There are many other considerations which are not directly relevant to our 
concerns or about which we have nothing to contribute. For instance, Nevins 
(2004: 123) argues on the basis of ‘parametric ambiguity’1 that “variation is the 
result of maintaining multiple parameter settings simultaneously” (cf. Yang 
2002). We are suspicious of this position as it looks like a conceptually undesir-
able version of ‘multiple grammars’ (for discussion, see Smith, in press). 
 We turn now to the main concern of the article: Suggesting, illustrating, 
and defending a number of criteria which variation has to meet to count as para-
metric rather than accidental. 
 The theory of PV hypothesizes that the range of choices is ‘antecedently 
known’, and this basic property correlates with a number of others which 
distinguish PV from non-parametric variation, and allow us to provide identity 
criteria for it. Being antecedently known may not be as straightforward as we 
have previously (Smith & Law 2007, in press) assumed. There is both a termino-
logical and a substantive issue. Chomsky (2009b: 395) observes that in many 
languages the expression used for ‘knowing a language’ does not involve the 
word ‘know’, but rather the equivalent of ‘come’, ‘hear’, or ‘have’. This has pro-
bably underlain some of the philosophical dispute about whether knowledge of 
language, in the sense of competence, constitutes real knowledge or not, but this 
terminological concern is of minor importance in the present context. The sub-
stantive issue is whether ‘antecedently known’ entails cognitively ‘represented’ 
or could refer simply to ‘architectural’ (third factor) constraints on the hypothesis 
space. The strongest position is that all options are laid out — so ‘represented’ — 
prior to experience and whatever abilities the child brings to the task of first 
language acquisition are deployed to select among them. The weaker, archi-
tectural, position may be preferable if it allows properties of the language faculty 
to be derived from more general considerations.  
                                                
    1  This refers to the situation where several analyses or structures could underlie the data of 
interest. 
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 Whichever position is correct, we take our first criterion to be that variants 
licensed by parametric choice must be cognitively represented. To make clear 
what motivates this condition, consider by contrast acclimatization, specifically 
sweating. We have a critical period for setting our sweating switch: Experiencing 
hot and humid weather in the first three years of life leads to a different setting 
from exposure to different conditions, and these settings cannot be significantly 
altered thereafter (Gluckman & Hanson 2005: 7). Despite a certain superficial 
similarity, this is not PV because the different states are not (mentally) repre-
sented and have no cognitive effects. Further, it is relevant to note that where 
there is evidence that some linguistic fact is not represented there is also evidence 
that this is not a domain of PV. For instance, Smith (2003, in press) claims that the 
learning child does not represent its own mispronounced output (e.g., saying 
[bɔkəl] for bottle), but equally such mispronunciation does not constitute the 
locus of PV. 
 This leads to our second criterion: systematicity. This is implicit in Moro’s 
(2008: 106) remark that the relevant domain is one where variation is “minimal 
and systematic”; or equivalently, to what Biberauer (2008a: 2) describes as ‘non-
random’ variation. A simple example is provided by irregular morphology of the 
type exemplified by the impossibility of *amn’t in (most varieties of) English, or 
the kind of defective paradigm seen in Latin vis–vim–vi. We do not consider this 
to be PV because it is by definition not systematic and hence we could not 
plausibly acquire knowledge of it by any process of triggering in the way which 
is plausible for systematic contrasts such as the possibility of null determiners or 
the absence of codas. Although systematicity and ‘potentially triggered’ may be 
extensionally the same the two notions are conceptually distinct so need to be 
kept separate, but we link them under a single criterion. 
 Our third criterion is dependence on the input; that is, the variant chosen 
must correspond to a possible state of the adult language, and hence can be 
illustrated most clearly from first language acquisition. The head-direction 
parameter clearly reflects properties of the ambient language in a way that is not 
characteristic of all variation. An example of systematic but input-independent 
and non-parametric variation is provided by the individual differences in 
consonant harmony in phonological development (cf. Smith 1973: 163), or the 
variation in the choice of initial or final negation in syntactic development (cf. 
Smith 2005: 29). For instance, two children in essentially the same environment 
may produce the adult duck as [gʌk] and [dʌt] respectively. These may both be 
manifestations of consonant harmony, but they do not count as PV because the 
particular variants chosen appear to be independent of the input (and consonant 
harmony is anyway essentially alien to adult phonology). A comparable syntactic 
example is provided by the development of negation. All children typically go 
through a stage in which the negator is peripheral, either initial or final. Indivi-
dual children then differ such that one child learning English may say ‘no like 
cabbage’ and another ‘like cabbage no’. We take such variation to be non-parametric 
as no language allows only such peripheral negation. This universal exclusion 
enables us to differentiate this non-parametric variation from UG-licensed errors 
of the sort described by Crain and his colleagues (cf. Crain & Pietroski 2002). A 
child may produce a form which never occurs in the input (e.g., ‘What do you 
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think what pigs eat?’) because the structure is licensed by UG and so occurs as a 
parametric choice in other languages.2 Despite this potential complication, the 
case of consonant harmony in phonology and negation in syntax should make 
the conceptual contrast between parametric and non-parametric variation clear.  
 Our fourth criterion is that PV must be deterministic:3 That is, the input to 
the child must be rich enough and explicit enough to guarantee that a parameter 
such as pro-drop or the presence of complex onsets in phonology can be set. If the 
input does not meet this requirement we are dealing with non-parametric 
variation. A syntactic example is provided by sequence of tense phenomena 
where individual variation verges on the random (see Smith & Cormack 2002). A 
phonological example is provided by Yip (2003: 804) who argues that some 
speakers treat a post-consonantal glide as a secondary articulation of the conso-
nant, others as a segment in its own right: “[T]he rightful home of /y/ [is] under-
determined by the usual data, leaving room for variation”. Her conclusion is that 
“speakers opt for different structures in the absence of conclusive evidence for 
either”. Again that indicates for us that the variation is non-parametric. Determi-
nisticness suggests that the process of parameter-setting must be ‘reflexive’ (cf. 
Chomsky 2009b: 384) but, as with systematicity and triggering, the notions are 
conceptually distinct so we keep them apart, though again not as separate 
criteria. 
 Our fifth criterion is suggested by an observation of Dupoux & Jacob 
(2007) to the effect that PV in language is ‘discrete’ (usually binary), whereas in 
other domains — moral judgment, for instance — one typically finds continuous 
scales. A linguistic example of the contrast is provided by vowel height. Whether 
a language displays 2, 3, or 4 degrees of vowel height in its phonological system 
is a matter of parametric choice(s). The degree to which the particular articulation 
of some vowel is high — either randomly or as a matter of individual difference 
(maybe my articulations of [i] are systematically higher than yours) is continuous 
and could not be parametric.  
 Our sixth criterion is ‘exclusivity’. PV gives rise to mutually exclusive 
possibilities: Languages are either [+pro-drop] or [–pro-drop] — the choice leaves 
no room for compromise, no language is both. By contrast, the choice in a [+pro-
drop] language of using or not using a subject pronoun is non-parametric. The 
contrast is again most obvious with morality where moral diversity involves 
“different preference orderings among competing members of a finite set of 
universal moral values” (Dupoux & Jacob 2007: 377). An extension of mutual 
exclusivity would be that the choices are exhaustive in that they exhaust the 
relevant hypothesis space interdependently. That is, the parameters are not 
independent (as claimed explicitly in e.g., Manzini & Wexler 1987) but are 
hierarchically nested: The choice of a parameter [±X], gives rise to a range of 
further choices within each of [+X] and [–X], and apparent exceptions to 
exclusivity are due to choices being either subordinate or parallel to a given 
parameter. We do not make this (non-)independence criterial as we know of no 
                                                
    2  We take it that such over-generalization is a sign that the child has, temporarily, mis-set the 
relevant parameter. 
    3  Compare Nevins’ (2004: 120) approving remark that his (multiple-precedence) view of redu-
plication “yields a deterministic output”. 
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cogent evidence either for or against. Similarly, although the phrasing used here 
in terms of [±X] suggests binarity, which is often presupposed in terms of 
[strong/weak] in the literature (see e.g., Radford et al. 2009: 314), we see no 
reason to make this essential. 
 A possible further seventh criterion is ‘irreversibility’: That is, the putative 
impossibility of the re-setting of parameters in second language acquisition (see 
e.g., Tsimpli & Smith 1991). The implicit contrast is with the reversible variations 
found in lexical learning. For instance, despite half a century’s exposure to 
examples like “I didn’t see him yet”, one of us (NS) still judges them ungramma-
tical (the only licit possibility is “I haven’t seen him yet”). This is in contrast to 
examples like the second sentence of this article, written without malice afore-
thought, which begins: “The tension is sufficiently great that many writers […]”. 
This construction was originally ungrammatical for NS (the only licit possibility 
being “The tension is sufficiently great for many writers to have […]”) but has 
now changed its status. The former contrast is arguably a matter of PV, the latter 
not.  
 We summarize and illustrate the foregoing criteria in the following table: 
 
1.  Parametric choices must be cognitively represented 
Parametric 
stress  
word order 
Non-parametric 
sweating  
consonant harmony  
2.  Choices must be systematic — variations are not accidents 
Parametric 
±null subject 
Non-parametric 
irregular morphology  
3.  Choices must be dependent on the input and hence correspond to a possible 
state of the adult language 
Parametric 
quantity-sensitivity 
word order — head direction 
Non-parametric 
consonant harmony 
word order in early negation  
4. Choices must be deterministic 
Parametric  
pro-drop 
complex onsets in phonology  
Non-parametric 
sequence of tense  
Post-consonantal glides 
5. Choices must be discrete 
Parametric 
number of vowel heights 
Non-parametric 
realization of vowel height 
6. Choices must be mutually exclusive 
Parametric 
±pro-drop 
Non-parametric 
choice of a pronoun (or not) in a pro-
drop language 
7.  Choices must be irreversible  
Parametric 
temporal adverbial modification 
Non-parametric 
sub-categorization possibilities 
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 A number — a huge number — of issues remain open. We list a few below: 
 
(1) We have in general not committed ourselves to where the parametric choices 
reside. It is not clear whether there is a single answer, but we assume in the 
absence of definitive evidence that all such choices are lexical. 
 
(2) It would be helpful to determine which of these criteria might derive from 
other properties, bearing in mind that nothing so derivable would be part of 
FLN. In particular, it is desirable to establish which criteria (e.g., deter-
ministicness and mutual exclusivity) might fall out from general properties of 
complex cognitive systems (‘third-factor’ considerations, where these include 
general learning strategies and principles of computational efficiency’, as in 
Chomsky, in press: 15 [2008 manuscript]).4 An example in principle is provided 
by the head-direction parameter. It seems clear that the choice between head-first 
and head-last is a function of the need for linearization imposed by the temporal 
structure of speech. Given that ‘merge’ combines A and B it is physically neces-
sary either that A precede B or that B precede A. In such a situation, as Boeckx 
(2009: 198) observes, appeal to a parameter may be supererogatory. Two points 
are, however, relevant. First, the physical necessity for linearization may be the 
ultimate cause of the parameter but the skew distribution of the world’s lang-
uages and the consistency of head direction within a language suggest that the 
parameter does exist: The physical constraint has led to grammaticalization of the 
parameter. Second, although this parameter has a ‘third factor’ motivation it is 
only one example and not a criterion for parameterhood whose status is affected. 
For plausible instances of a criterion being rendered unnecessary we probably 
need to look elsewhere. We leave the issue for future research. 
 
(3) In earlier work (Smith 2007; Smith & Law 2007, in press) we have investigated 
whether the criteria for parametric status allow a generalization to other 
domains, either human or animal, suggesting that our knowledge of music and 
our moral judgment might be such examples in the former domain, and birdsong 
in the latter. We are currently less sanguine about the possibility.  
 
 The preceding discussion implies that many of the parameters postulated 
in the literature are, by our criteria, accidents rather than reflecting genuine, but 
not exceptionless, generalizations. We have already alluded to some of the work 
of Kayne and Manzini, and Evans & Levinson (2009: 432) explicitly assume that 
parameters account for all differences: The ‘full set of possible combinations’. 
Our attempt to delineate criteria for PV should not in any way be taken to 
impugn the value of the work of these authors, but we think it is time for the 
theory to be put on a more explicit footing. We await corroboration or refutation 
of our putative criteria with anticipation and apprehension in equal measure. 
                                                
    4  Though we are skeptical of the claim that “[t]o externalize the internally generated expres-
sion ‘what John is eating what’, it would be necessary to pronounce ‘what’ twice, and that 
turns out to place a very considerable burden on computation” (Berwick & Chomsky, 
forthcoming: 11 [in the 2008 manuscript]). The burden seems slight, especially given that in 
first language acquisition children regularly repeat material ‘unnecessarily’ (see the 
examples from Crain & Pietroski 2002 above). 
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